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Abstract Since the National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s
(NPCSC) reversal of the Court of Final Appeal’s abrasive decision of Ng
Ka Ling, the court has become cognizant of the repercussions of its
decisions and has now adopted a pragmatic view toward its adjudica-
tory role. Where decisions implicate the validity of Mainland Chinese
laws or NPCSC decisions, the court would always defer to the central
government. Notwithstanding the court’s recognition of the supremacy
of the NPCSC, the court has remained very diligent in preserving its
prerogative as the primary interpreter of the Basic Law. Where disputes
concern alleged human rights violations that have no People’s Republic
of China (PRC) implications but have law and order implications in
Hong Kong, the courts are generally conservative so as to afford the
legislature or the executive much latitude in maintaining peace and
stability. With regard to disputes with neither NPCSC nor domestic law
and order implications, the court is confident that any political backlash
against an adverse decision would be minimal; in these instances, the
court is therefore more conscious of avoiding the austerity of tabulated
legalism and is enthused about providing a generous interpretation of
the Basic Law.
I. Introduction
1 July 2007 marks the first decade of the People’s Republic of China’s
(PRC) resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and the concom-
itant establishment of the Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)
under the sacred but somewhat elusive principle of ‘One Country, Two
Systems’. After British rule, the Basic Law became the foundational
constitutional instrument that governs the autonomous province. From
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the outset, the Hong Kong judiciary, tasked under the Basic Law to
be the independent adjudicator between the government and the
aggrieved citizenry, had the unenviable task of safeguarding the
constitutionally enshrined fundamental liberties in the region whilst
tending to the political sensitivities of the central government in
China. This is no menial feat as it requires the preservation of the
robust common law tradition within the confines of an essentially
Chinese civil law instrument. The inevitable tussle for power between
the judiciary, the executive branch of the Hong Kong government and
the National People’s Congress of the PRC was bound to ensue.
Ng Ka Ling marked a milestone in the constitutional history of the
HKSAR as the Court of Final Appeal (CFA), in its first decision after
the handover, asserted the power to declare Hong Kong Ordinances
unconstitutional.1 More controversially, the CFA also proclaimed that
the Hong Kong judiciary had the requisite duty and power to declare
any legislative acts of the National People’s Congress (NPC) (or its
Standing Committee, NPCSC) inconsistent with the Basic Law.2 This
bold assertion naturally triggered the wrath of the Mainland and
HKSAR government and was the catalyst to an unfortunate constitu-
tional stand-off between the CFA and Beijing. Following a rabid chas-
tisement that took the form of the First Interpretation by the Standing
Committee of the NPC, the HK courts beat a hasty retreat in Lau Kong
Yung wherein the CFA recognized the plenary powers of the NPC in
constitutional interpretation.3 Their perceived abdication of the judi-
cial duty to defend the rights of the Hong Kong people has naturally
led to a general pessimism by academics about the fate of constitu-
tional review in Hong Kong.4 Others, like Professor Albert Chen, have
become more optimistic as he perceives the judiciary to have chosen
‘the golden mean between confrontation with and subservience to
Beijing’.5
In this paper, I would essentially argue that since Ng Ka Ling, the
CFA has become cognizant of the repercussions of its decisions and
legislative/executive reaction as such and has now adopted a prag-
matic view toward its adjudicatory role and is keenly conscious of the
consequences of its actions. Where decisions implicate the validity of
PRC laws or NPCSC decisions, the courts would always defer to the
central government. Notwithstanding the CFA’s recognition of the
supremacy of the NPCSC, the court has remained very diligent in
1 [1999] 1 HKLRD 315 at 337.
2 Ibid.
3 [1999] 3 HKLRD 778 at 798.
4 T. Martin, ‘Hong Kong Right of Abode: Ng Siu Tung & Others v Director of
Immigration—Constitutional and Human Rights at the Mercy of China’ (2004) 5
San Diego International Law Journal 465 and S. Marsden, ‘Regional Autonomy,
Judicial Criticism and 2005 Interpretation: Judicial Independence in Hong Kong
Compromised Again?’, 36 Hong Kong Law Journal 117.
5 A. Chen, ‘Constitutional Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong’ (2006) Pacific Rim
Law and Policy Journal 627.
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preserving its prerogative as the primary interpreter of the Basic Law.
Where disputes concern alleged human rights violations that have no
PRC implications but have law and order implications in Hong Kong,
the courts are generally conservative so as to afford the legislature or
the executive much latitude in maintaining peace and stability. With
regard to disputes with neither NPCSC nor domestic law and order
implications, the CFA is confident that any political backlash against
an adverse decision would be minimal; in these instances, the court is
therefore more conscious of avoiding the austerity of tabulated legal-
ism and is enthused about providing a generous interpretation of the
Basic Law.
Section II of this paper begins with an expository tale of the Ng Ka
Ling saga. It will chart and critique the dramatic rise and retreat of
judicial power over the course of one brief year. Sections III to V
continue with a critical examination of the judicial record of the CFA
after Lau Kong Yung. Section III will focus on those disputes that
implicate relations with the central government; Section IV will ex-
plore cases with no Mainland dimensions but which implicate internal
law and order concerns and finally Section V will examine conflicts
with neither concern. Essentially, I will debunk the conventional wis-
dom that post First Interpretation, the appellate courts in Hong Kong
are pursuing a consistent path of moderate liberalism;6 instead I will
argue that the liberality of their decisions hinges on the consequences
they pose to Mainland relations and internal law and order issues.
II. Ng Ka Ling Saga
In Ng Ka Ling, the applicants were children born in the Mainland to
Hong Kong permanent residents. Their appeal essentially hinged on
whether their right of abode in Hong Kong, as provided under Article
24(3) of the Basic Law,7 had been contravened by two Immigration
Ordinances passed by the Hong Kong Provisional Legislative Council
days after the handover. Essentially, the Ordinances required Main-
landers who wished to exercise the right of abode arising by descent
to satisfy Hong Kong’s Director of Immigration that they were indeed
permanent residents and subsequently to obtain the Mainland author-
ities’ permission to leave for Hong Kong. Furthermore, the Ordinance
imposed criminal sanctions retrospectively on parties who entered
Hong Kong after the entry of the Basic Law but before the enactment
of the relevant immigration provisions.
6 See ibid. at 630.
7 Article 24 reads: ‘The permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall be: (1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or
after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; (2)
Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous
period of not less than seven years before or after the establishment of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region; (3) Persons of Chinese nationality born
outside Hong Kong of those residents listed in categories (1) and (2)’.
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On appeal to the CFA, the Chief Justice, on behalf of a unanimous
bench, held that:
In exercising their judicial power conferred by the Basic Law, the courts
of the Region have a duty to enforce and interpret that Law. They un-
doubtedly have the jurisdiction to examine whether legislation enacted
by the legislature of the Region or acts of the executive authorities of the
Region are consistent with the Basic Law and, if found to be incon-
sistent, to hold them to be invalid.8
This statement, though uncontroversial in light of Marbury v Madison9
and numerous justiciable Bills of Rights littered across the common law
jurisdictions, is significant in so far as the CFA is asserting, in its first
decision since the handover, that the judiciary would perform its con-
stitutional role of acting as a constitutional brake on the legislative or
executive excesses of the Hong Kong government.
More controversial is the CFA’s next declaration that sparked off
the inevitable stand-off with Beijing. Rather immodestly, the judiciary
held that the Hong Kong courts have the jurisdiction and duty to
declare any legislative acts of the NPC or its Standing Committee
inconsistent with the Basic Law if so found.10 Its reasons were three-
fold. First, the power of the Hong Kong courts to declare NPC acts
inconsistent with the Basic Law was derived from the Sovereign (the
NPC) given that the NPC had enacted, pursuant to Article 31 of the
Chinese constitution, the Basic Law for the region.11 Second, as with
other constitutions in the world, the Hong Kong courts had been
vested with independent judicial power within the high degree of
autonomy granted to the region and since it was for the Hong Kong
courts to determine questions of legislative invalidity when they
arose, this necessarily included the power to determine whether an
act of the NPC is consistent with the Basic Law.12 Lastly, the court
added that since the Basic Law was enacted to implement China’s
commitment, under the Joint Declaration with the British, to maintain
the status quo in Hong Kong for 50 years as evidenced in Article
159(4) of the Basic Law,13 the duty of the Hong Kong courts to enforce
and interpret the Basic Law necessarily entails the power to strike
down acts of the NPC that flouted this principle.14
The first reason can be easily dismissed. Just because the NPC
enacted the region’s Basic Law pursuant to its powers under the
Chinese constitution, it does not necessarily follow that the regional
judiciary has been granted the power to declare the NPC’s acts incon-
sistent with the regional constitution. The second rationale stands on
8 [1999] 1 HKLRD 315 at 337.
9 5 US 137 (1803).
10 [1999] 1 HKLRD 315 at 337.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. at 338.
13 Article 159(4) reads: ‘No amendment to this Law shall contravene the established
basic policies of the People’s Republic of China regarding Hong Kong’.
14 [1999] 1 HKLRD 315 at 338.
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even weaker grounds. Even if Hong Kong has been granted a high
degree of autonomy over internal issues and the courts independent
judicial power such that they can invalidate local Ordinances for
being inconsistent with the Basic Law, it does not follow that the NPC
has granted the regional courts the prerogative to invalidate its deci-
sions for being so.
The most compelling argument for the existence of this power lies
in the third reason. If I may rephrase this argument, it goes as follows:
if the Hong Kong courts do not have the power to invalidate NPC
decisions for being inconsistent with the Basic Law, the regional
courts would be impotent in the face of any attempt by China to
breach its treaty obligations under the Joint Declaration or its con-
stitutional obligation under Article 159(4) to preserve the established
basic policies regarding Hong Kong. Seen in this light, arguably the
Hong Kong courts’ jurisdiction to enforce and interpret the Basic Law
necessarily includes the jurisdiction to adjudicate over acts of the NPC
to ensure consistency with the Basic Law. However, read against
Article 158 of the Basic Law, the tenability of this reading collapses.
Article 158(1) unambiguously (and unfortunately I may add) vests the
power of interpretation in the Standing Committee of the NPC. Article
158(2) continues by adding that the Standing Committee is to ‘author-
ize’ the courts of Hong Kong to interpret, on their own, provisions of
the Basic Law which are within the limits of the region’s autonomy.
Therefore, since pursuant to Article 158(2), the power of interpreta-
tion granted to the Hong Kong courts is a delegated power from the
NPC, it is legally untenable for the grantee to possess the powers to
override the acts of the grantor. Article 158(3) of the Basic Law con-
firms this reading:
If the courts of the Region, in adjudicating cases, need to interpret the
provisions of this Law concerning affairs which are the responsibility
of the Central People’s Government, or concerning the relationship
between the Central Authorities and the Region, the Courts of the Region
shall, before making their final judgments which are non-appealable,
seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress through the Court of Final
Appeal of the Region. When the Standing Committee makes an inter-
pretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of the Region, in
applying those provisions, shall follow the interpretation of the Standing
Committee. (emphasis supplied)
Certainly, the question of whether Hong Kong courts have the author-
ity to invalidate NPC acts concerns ‘the relationship between the Cen-
tral Authorities and the Region’ and in so far as the courts have a
constitutional obligation to seek and abide by an Interpretation from
the Standing Committee, the judiciary is therefore deprived of the
power to invalidate NPC decisions for being inconsistent with the
Basic Law.
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The second controversy surrounding Ng Ka Ling stemmed from the
CFA’s refusal to refer the interpretation of Articles 22(4) and 24(3) to
the Standing Committee and the court’s insistence on interpreting
these provisions on its own. Essentially in Ng Ka Ling, the CFA was
confronted with two Basic Law provisions that ostensibly were in
conflict. Article 22(4) states that for entry into Hong Kong, people
from other parts of China must apply for approval from the compe-
tent authorities of the central government. Notwithstanding Article
22(4), Article 24(3) states that persons of Chinese nationality born
outside Hong Kong to the region’s permanent residents are to have
the right of abode. The CFA held that such a duty to make a reference
to the Standing Committee would only arise under Article 158 if two
conditions were satisfied: (1) the Basic Law provisions under exam-
ination concern affairs which are the responsibility of the central
people’s government or the relationship between the central author-
ities and Hong Kong (henceforth termed ‘the classification condition’)
and (2) the CFA needs to interpret such provisions as the interpreta-
tion will affect the judgment on the case (henceforth termed ‘the
necessity condition’).15 Interestingly, the court held that in deciding
whether the classification condition is satisfied, the judiciary must first
identify which is the predominant provision that has to be interpreted.
If the predominant provision is an excluded provision, the court has
an obligation to refer its construction to the Standing Committee; but
if the predominant provision is not an excluded provision, ‘no refer-
ence needs to be made, although an excluded provision is arguably
relevant to the construction of the non-excluded provision even to the
extent of qualifying it’.16
Unfortunately, the CFA did not reason but simply declared that
Article 24 was the predominant provision and not Article 22, and
since the former provision concerned the recognition of permanent
residency in Hong Kong, it did not relate to the relationship between
the central authorities and the region and a reference to the Standing
Committee was unnecessary. The rationale the court gave for this
conclusion was provided in one short half-hearted explanation which
stated cursorily that Article 24 is the ‘very source of the right which is
sought to be enforced by the applicants in these appeals’.17 Certainly
the appellants were relying on Article 24 to establish their right of
abode, but as to how that made Article 24 the predominant provision
that trumped a conflicting Article 22, the CFA decided to leave us all
in the dark.
Eminent Basic Law scholar Professor Albert Chen has since attacked
the CFA’s reasoning on two fronts. First, he argues that the ‘necessity
condition’ should be addressed first before the ‘classification condition’
15 [1999] 1 HKLRD 315 at 342.
16 Ibid. at 344.
17 Ibid. at 345.
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and not the inverse approach taken by the courts; after all there is
nothing for the court to classify unless and until the court first identi-
fies, by the use of the necessity condition, what particular provisions
of the Basic Law need to be so classified.18 On this front, Albert Chen’s
critique is undoubtedly right and I will not labour the point further.
His second criticism is more interesting. He argues that only Article
22(4) and not Article 24 is necessary for the purpose of deciding the
issues in Ng Ka Ling because, so far as the exit permit scheme regulat-
ing Mainlanders’ entry into Hong Kong is concerned, the interpreta-
tion of Article 24(2) and (3) is irrelevant and the court has erred in not
referring the interpretation of Article 22(4) to the Standing Com-
mittee.19 As explained by Albert Chen, ‘There is nothing ambiguous in
the wording of Article 24(3). The ambiguity lies in the wording of
Article 22(4)’.20 Unfortunately, I would beg to differ. The ambiguity
surrounding Article 24(2) and (3) concerns whether the right of abode
conferred on Mainland-born Chinese citizens taking residency status
by descent is either independent of or qualified by the Article 22
regulatory scheme which the CFA conceded rightly to be an excluded
provision. Where we have two conflicting Basic Law provisions, one
which falls within the limits of the autonomy of the region and an-
other which concerns the relationship between the responsibility of
the central authorities and the region, it is impossible to adjudicate on
one provision independent of the other, and I would thus have argued
that it would have been necessary to refer this conflict between
Article 22 and Article 24, that is to say, to refer both provisions, to the
Standing Committee, as a conflict between both provisions cannot be
reconciled in isolation from one another. Therefore the gist of this
interpretive controversy stems not from the ambiguity of Article 22
per se, but the apparent conflict between Article 24 and Article 22.
Similarly, the CFA’s touchstone ‘predominant provision’ test is flawed:
where there are two conflicting Basic Law provisions, one which falls
within the prerogative of the central government, ipso facto this con-
flict should be resolved by the Standing Committee. In any case, as
argued further, the CFA has been disingenuous about the application
of such a test, as it paid scant attention as to how the predominant
provision may be identified and merely arbitrarily declared Article 24
to be predominant.
Consequently, the CFA held that the Immigration Ordinance was
unconstitutional to the extent that it required permanent residents of
the region residing on the Mainland to hold a one-way permit before
they could enjoy the constitutional right of abode.21 To the extent that
the Ordinance applied retrospective criminal sanctions, the court
18 A. Chen, ‘Ng Ka Ling and Article 158(3) of the Basic Law’ (2001–2002) Journal of
Chinese and Comparative Law 222 at 227.
19 Ibid. at 234.
20 Ibid.
21 [1999] 1 HKLRD 315 at 348.
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readily excised the impugned provisions.22 Furthermore, the court
also invalidated a statutory bar that excluded the recognition of per-
manent residency for illegitimate Mainland children born to men who
were Hong Kong permanent residents.23 In the same vein, the CFA in
Chan Kam Nga, a judgment issued on the same day as Ng Ka Ling,
invalidated a statutory bar that limited the right of abode to children
who were born after and not before their parents acquired permanent
residency in Hong Kong.24
The CFA’s bold and unequivocal assertion of judicial power was
welcomed by human rights commentators who were worried that the
promise of autonomy under the Basic Law would prove to be illusory
after the handover. Naturally, the central government and those
within its inner sanctum were not amused and perceived the CFA’s
gratuitous grab for power as a direct challenge to its sovereignty and
interpretive mandate.25 The Hong Kong government, on the other
hand, was more concerned about the practical ramifications that
would result from the massive influx of immigrants from the Mainland
and the strain this would impose on the province’s healthcare, hous-
ing and social welfare system. An application for the CFA to ‘clarify’
its decision in Ng Ka Ling was thus sought and in light of the con-
troversy which the decision had engendered, the court acceded to the
request and issued its clarification. In a very terse judgment, the court
accepted that the Standing Committee had the authority to issue a
constitutional Interpretation under Article 158 which would have to
be followed by the courts of the region.26 But more interestingly, the
court followed this concession with a veiled re-assertion of judicial
power:
The Court accepts that it cannot question, the authority of the National
People’s Congress or the Standing Committee to do any act which is in
accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure
therein.27
What the CFA left deliberately unspoken was the court’s amenability
to the questioning and subsequent invalidation of the acts of the NPC
or the Standing Committee which it deems not to be in accordance
with the Basic Law. Strangely, the subversive nuances in Ng Ka Ling
(No 2) were lost on the central government and Beijing was suffi-
ciently appeased by the clarification.28 The Hong Kong government
22 Ibid. at 352.
23 Ibid. at 354.
24 [1999] 1 HKLRD 304.
25 M. O’Neill, ‘Beijing Says Abode Ruling was Wrong and Should Be Changed’
(1999, 9 Feb) South China Morning Post (Hong Kong).
26 [1999] 1 HKLRD 577 at 578.
27 Ibid.
28 The NPC chose neither to address the Ng Ka Ling ruling at its annual plenum
session nor refer the matter to the Standing Committee. See ‘One Country, Two
Legal Systems?’ Report of the Joseph Crowley Program (1999) 23 Fordham
International Law Journal 1.
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was, however, not to be deterred or dissuaded. First, the government
waged a media war by raising the ominous spectre of 1.67 million
Mainlanders trooping into Hong Kong over the next seven years with
catastrophic consequences on governmental resources,29 thereby
turning the tide of public opinion against the court. Next, the SAR
government returned to Beijing and sought an Interpretation from
the Standing Committee to reverse Ng Ka Ling definitively.
The Standing Committee issued its First Interpretation under the
Basic Law on 26 June 1999, stating unequivocally that Mainland
children born to Hong Kong permanent residents must obtain the
requisite exit permits before they can acquire the right of abode in
Hong Kong and for this right to arise under Article 24(3), either par-
ent must be a Hong Kong permanent resident at the time of the child’s
birth.30 Whilst the Interpretation did not disturb the CFA’s extension
of the right of abode to illegitimate children of Hong Kong permanent
residents, and excluded the parties in the Ng Ka Ling/Chan Kam Nga
litigation from its application, the rights of all others would be deter-
mined by reference to this Interpretation.31
Following this rabid chastisement, the CFA eventually caved in in
Lau Kong Yung when the court recognized the complete and plenary
powers to interpret every provision of the Basic Law:
The power of interpretation of the Basic Law conferred by Article 158(1)
is in general and unqualified terms.32
This was a major concession by the court as it recognized the free-
standing general interpretive mandate that the Standing Committee
possessed, an unqualified power it had not previously affirmed in Ng
Ka Ling (1) or (2). There were many options open to the court. It could
have held, as counsel for the abode seekers argued, that the Standing
Committee could only issue an Interpretation upon a judicial refer-
ence by the court over a dispute relating to the excluded provisions.
This option was rightly rejected. As recognized by the court, the
authority delegated by Article 158(2) and (3) to the courts stems from
the general power of interpretation vested in the Standing Committee
under Article 158(1). To accept counsel’s submission would be to deny
the Standing Committee the power to interpret all provisions of the
29 Chris Yeung, ‘The Cost of Dealing with This Dilemma’ (1999, 8 May) South China
Morning Post (Hong Kong) 15. See Fung Ho-lup, ‘The Right of Abode Issue’ in
Wong Yiu-Chung (ed.), One Country, Two Systems in Crisis: Hong Kong’s
Transformation since the Handover (Lexington Books: Lanham, MD, 2004) where
the author discussed how the statistics provided by the government were grossly
inflated.
30 See Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the NPC on Arts. 22(4) and
24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, http://www.info.gov.hk/
basic_law/fulltext.
31 See ibid., para. 2.
32 [1999] 3 HKLRD 778 at 798.
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Basic Law save the excluded provisions; a position inconsistent with
the general power conferred by Article 158(1).33
Notwithstanding the CFA’s recognition of the supremacy of the
NPCSC’s Interpretation, the court interestingly announced that the
No 3 Ordinance, s. 1(2) was still unconstitutional.34 Although the Inter-
pretation resurrected the legality of the Ordinance in so far as it
sought to subject Mainland children born to Hong Kong permanent
residents to the regulatory exit permit scheme, the court held that the
Interpretation was silent on the Ordinance’s second basis for infir-
mity, namely that it attempted to impose criminal sanctions retro-
spectively on parties who entered Hong Kong after the enactment of
the Basic Law but prior to the enactment of the statute on 9 July
1997.35 Since this ground was not affected by the Interpretation, the
court held that the retrospective provision remained invalid. Admit-
tedly, this judicial manoeuvre had minimal practical impact, that is it
only protected immigrants who arrived in Hong Kong between 1 and
10 July from criminal sanctions; but the significance of this holding lay
in the judicial methodology applied. From henceforth, whilst the
courts would respect and abide by the free-standing interpretive man-
date of the NPCSC, the Interpretation would be read narrowly and
strictly. The message was clear: the court would remain the primary
albeit not final interpreter of the Basic Law.
Moreover, nowhere in Lau Kong Yung did the court retract its
earlier pronouncement in Ng Ka Ling that it had the power to declare
acts of the NPC or NPCSC inconsistent with the Basic Law. Reading
Lau Kong Yung against Ng Ka Ling, it would appear that the court
only conceded that an NPC Interpretation was final; absent an Inter-
pretation, the judiciary would remain amenable to the invalidation of
NPC acts which they deem inconsistent with the Basic Law.
III. The CFA and the Central Government
Shortly after deciding Lau Kong Yung, the CFA handed down another
politically charged judgment in Ng Kung Siu.36 In that case, the accused
argued that the statutory sanctions against the desecration of the
national and regional flags were unconstitutional violations of their
freedom of expression as protected under Article 27 of the Basic Law.
The CFA disagreed, stating instead that there were legitimate societal
interests in keeping the symbols of nationhood and sovereignty above
the strife of politics.37 Furthermore, the criminal prohibition against
flag desecration was a limited restriction of the freedom of expression
as it banned only one mode of expression and did not interfere with a
33 Ibid. at 799.
34 Ibid. at 803.
35 Ibid.
36 [1999] 3 HKLRD 907.
37 Ibid. at 933.
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person’s freedom to express the same message by other means.38
Naturally the CFA’s reasoning did not sit well with many scholars.
Raymond Wacks in particular waxed lyrical about Hong Kong’s flag-
ging rights and lamented that the court’s conclusion undermined its
own asseveration that the freedom of expression lies at the heart of
Hong Kong’s way of life and the courts’ exhortation about giving a
generous interpretation to this constitutional guarantee which in-
cludes the right to express ideas which the majority and the govern-
ment may find offensive.39
My intention here is not to discuss the inadequacies of the CFA’s
legal reasoning, for Wacks has done so more than adequately and
with much flourish. Instead my purpose is to explore what the CFA
did not discuss. Ostensibly the CFA was dealing with the constitution-
ality of two Ordinances, but what the court was actually avoiding was
the invalidation of a PRC law. Pursuant to Article 18(2) and (3) of the
Basic Law,40 the NPCSC had the power to apply to Hong Kong Main-
land laws that relate to affairs falling outside the limits of the region’s
autonomy. The National Flags Ordinance was the local implementa-
tion of the PRC Law on the National Flag applied to Hong Kong via
Article 18(3). The CFA was thus reluctant to declare the NPCSC’s act
of applying this PRC law to Hong Kong as being inconsistent with the
Basic Law, a power it had asserted in Ng Ka Ling but had relinquished
in Lau Kong Yung, as this would only trigger another Interpretation.
Nor did the judiciary want to set a precedent and make a reference to
the NPCSC on this matter, which ostensibly it should since the appli-
cation of this law, as classified by the NPCSC, related to affairs outside
the limits of Hong Kong’s autonomy, especially since this concerned a
cherished right as fundamental as the freedom of expression. In light
of all these possibilities, about which the court must have been aware
but remained silent in its judgment, the CFA probably decided that
the most politically viable path was to uphold the impugned legis-
lation. Given that flag desecration is symbolic speech and its message
could be communicated in many alternative ways, the CFA, in the
interests of safeguarding its long-term autonomy and independence,
probably chose the wiser option of allowing our flag-burning rights to
go up in smoke.
In sharp contrast to Ng Kung Siu was the judicial approach taken in
the right of abode case of Chong Fung Yuen.41 Here the Chinese
applicant was born in Hong Kong to parents who were not Hong
38 Ibid.
39 R. Wacks, ‘Our Flagging Rights’ (2000) HKLJ 1 at 3.
40 The Basic Law, Art. 18(3) reads: ‘The Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress may add to or delete from the list of laws in Annex III after consulting
its Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
and the government of the Region. Laws listed in Annex III to this Law shall be
confined to those relating to defence and foreign affairs as well as other matters
outside the limits of the autonomy of the Region as specified by this Law’.
41 [2001] 2 HKLRD 533.
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Kong permanent residents and he asserted his right of abode under
Article 24(1) which expressly provides that Chinese citizens born in
Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the HKSAR are Hong
Kong permanent residents. This plain, literal reading unfortunately
conflicts with an Immigration Ordinance which limits the enjoyment
of the right of abode to children born to Hong Kong permanent
residents.
The CFA rightly rejected the Director of Immigration’s contention
that in deciding whether Article 24(1) was an excluded provision that
required referral to the NPC, the legal test would be whether its
implementation would have a ‘substantive effect’ on the Mainland.42
Otherwise, most if not all the Articles in the Basic Law could poten-
tially be excluded provisions and this would spell the end of Hong
Kong’s judicial autonomy. In its place, the CFA asked whether the
disputed provision had the ‘character’ of one which concerns affairs
which are the responsibility of the central government or the relation-
ship between the central authorities and the region, but the CFA did
not offer any general guidance for determining the character of the
Basic Law provisions.43 All it did was to provide this pithy explanation
that the ‘character’ of Article 24(1) was one that falls within the re-
gion’s autonomy:
Its character is that of a provision defining one category of permanent
residents who are entitled to the right of abode.44
This conclusion is very puzzling. Article 24(3), the disputed provision
in Ng Ka Ling, also defined one category of permanent residents who
are entitled to the right of abode, but its conflict with Article 22(4), an
excluded provision, required resolution by the NPCSC. In my view,
the CFA should have instead asked whether the disputed provision
concerns a matter that falls within or conflicts with a power expressly
retained by the central government under the Basic Law, for example
Articles 13, 14, 15 and 22(4). Where the adjudication of a disputed
provision does not fall within or conflict with the power expressly
retained by the central government or NPC under the Basic Law, the
matter falls within the limits of autonomy delegated to the regional
courts and a judicial reference to the NPCSC is unnecessary.
Even if the CFA was not required to refer the interpretation of
Article 24(1) to the NPCSC, it was still faced with two powerful argu-
ments that would exclude Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong to non-
permanent residents from enjoying the right of abode.
First, as argued by the Director of Immigration, reading Article
24(1) in light of its purpose and context did not confer on such per-
sons the right of abode. The CFA admitted in Chong that this was the
interpretive methodology it would apply:
42 Ibid. at 551.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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When interpreting the provisions that define the categories of perma-
nent residents, the courts should simply consider the language in light
of any ascertainable purpose and context.45
Naturally, to ascertain the purpose and context of these provisions,
the judiciary would have to turn to extrinsic materials such as pre- or
post-enactment legislative aids for guidance.46 However, the CFA
rather astutely did not want to open the floodgates and allow for the
introduction of Mainland legal materials into Hong Kong’s constitu-
tional discourse and flatly reversed this mode of interpretation a few
paragraphs later:
The courts are bound to give effect to the clear meaning of the language.
The courts will not on the basis of any extrinsic materials depart from
that clear meaning and give the language a meaning which the language
cannot bear.47
By applying a plain, literal reading of the text, the court granted the
right of abode to the applicant and eschewed the prospect of admitting
Mainland legislative internal aids into Hong Kong’s constitutional liti-
gation. The court was totally disingenuous but absolutely ingenious.
Not content to leave matters at that, the court proceeded and gently
reminded its Mainland audience that:
Under a common law system which includes a separation of powers, the
interpretation of laws once enacted is a matter for the courts.48
But to pre-empt any outcry from the Mainland, the court was quick to
add that the court’s power would always be bound by any Inter-
pretation by the Standing Committee under Article 158.
Second, the fact remained that in the earlier NPCSC Interpretation,
the text included a passage which provided that ‘the legislative intent
of all other categories of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law’ had been
reflected in the Opinion of Preparatory Committee for the establish-
ment of the HKSAR. More significantly, under Chinese law, legislative
interpretations have the force of statutory enactments.49 Notwith-
standing this, the CFA skirted the issue by stating the following:
On the common law approach, which the court is under a duty to apply
in the absence of a binding interpretation by the Standing Committee,
the statement in question cannot affect the clear meaning of Art. 24(1)
properly reached, applying the common law approach.50
45 Ibid. at 546.
46 Moreover, it is disputable whether extrinsic materials such as the Preparatory
Opinions for the establishment of the HKSAR were mere statutory aids since
under the canons of Chinese civil law interpretation, once the Preparatory
Opinions are adopted by the national legislature, they would have the same legal
effect as a national law validly enacted by the NPC. See Lin Feng, Chinese
Constitutional Law (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2000) 107–11.
47 [2001] 2 HKLRD 533 at 547.
48 Ibid.
49 A. Chen, ‘The Interpretation of the Basic Law’ (2000) 30 HKLJ 380 at 411–16.
50 [2001] 2 HKLRD 533 at 555.
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The court seemed to suggest that the objective of an Interpretation
was directed at resolving the tensions between Articles 22(4) and 24(3)
and thus the unfortunate passage in the Interpretation was merely
obiter dicta and thus not binding on the Hong Kong courts. The main
difficulty with this reasoning is not that the court purported to uphold
the common law approach of distinguishing ratio decidendi from
obiter dicta. The controversy in my view concerns the legal grounds
which the court had for classifying the Interpretation not as a statu-
tory enactment, with all provisions binding on the court, but seem-
ingly as a superior court judgment with only its ratio binding. After
all, even under the common law tradition, if the Interpretation was
legislation, the courts would not have the power to decide which
statutory provisions are obiter and need not be enforced. Naturally,
the CFA did not offer a shred of legal reasoning as to why the Inter-
pretation should be viewed like a judgment and not legislation.
The Chong decision should thus be celebrated, not for upholding
the common law tradition (because the CFA was making up its own
legal tradition as it went along); it should instead be lauded for the
judicial astuteness shown by the CFA in asserting its autonomy in a
political environment which it knew it could win. The Director of
Immigration had conceded that an adverse decision against him
would not give rise to an immediate influx of Mainlanders, unlike the
tidal wave of immigration that Ng Ka Ling potentially generated.51
Only 555 children per annum would be eligible for the right of abode
this time. The court was thus confident that the government would
not be able to orchestrate another media blitz forecasting the doom
and gloom of Hong Kong and reverse the court’s decision with an-
other request to Beijing. The court must have known that this was an
opportune time as good as any to assert its own autonomy and defend
the rights of abode seekers coming by its protective shores.
This judicial awareness of political fallout was once again displayed
in Ng Siu Tung.52 In this case, the Mainland-born applicants to Hong
Kong permanent residents argued that they could claim the right of
abode, notwithstanding the NPC Interpretation, as they had received
either (1) general oral representations from senior government offi-
cials both before and after the judgments of Ng Ka Ling and Chan
Kam Nga that the government would abide by the court’s ruling, or
(2) specific written representations to individual applicants by the
Director of Immigration to the same effect, such that in either case,
they had a substantive legitimate expectation to be treated in the same
way as the actual claimants in those two litigations.
The majority in Ng Siu Tung eventually ruled in favour of those
applicants who had received specific written representations from the
government that they would be treated in the same way as the actual
51 Ibid. at 548–9.
52 [2002] 1 HKLRD 561.
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claimants in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga, because they formed
only ‘a discrete, ascertainable class’53 of about 1,000 claimants, as
opposed to those who had received general oral representations and
whose number exceeded 600,000.54 For the former group of appli-
cants, the removal orders against them were quashed and the Direc-
tor of Immigration had to decide afresh their applications to stay in
Hong Kong. This distinction drawn between the written representa-
tions and oral promises is legally dubious or highly technical at best.
As the dissenting judge, Justice Bokhary, pointed out:
All these representations, even those in the form of a communication to
an individual, are in substance of the kind directed to a class. The class is
the one made up of persons who would benefit from the application to
them of the judgments in favour of the abode seekers in Ng Ka Ling’s
case and Chan Kam Nga’s case.55
Nevertheless this result was probably inevitable and for the best. The
CFA was probably cognizant that to accept that the general repre-
sentees had a substantive legitimate expectation to seek a right of
abode in Hong Kong would in effect be defying the central tenor of
the NPC Interpretation, a prospect which the court could no longer
stomach.
IV. The CFA and Domestic Law and Order
In the realm of crime control, the CFA’s record has been starkly con-
servative. In upholding the mandatory nature of the life sentence for
all persons convicted of murder, the court disagreed that the imposi-
tion of such a uniform punishment was arbitrary even though the
moral probity of a mercy killer differs from that of a sadist.56
Even where the court ‘read down’ a statutory presumption, requir-
ing an accused charged with the possession of an imitation firearm to
prove he had a lawful excuse, to an evidential burden of production,
the CFA did so knowing that ‘the prosecution should have no abnor-
mal difficulty in proving the purpose of the defendant’s possession
where that possession is for an unlawful purpose’.57 Furthermore, the
court declined to read down the impugned statutory presumption to
cover just possession of an imitation firearm in a public place, prefer-
ring to preserve instead the application of the provisions over the
entire geographical area which the legislature intended, namely
private or public premises.58 This decision would not be so conten-
tious but for the fact that the court, earlier in the judgment, had
distinguished two English decisions which upheld a reverse onus in
53 Ibid. at 613.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. at 674.
56 Lau Cheong v HKSAR [2002] 2 HKLRD 612 at 644.
57 HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai [2006] 3 HKLRD 808 at 830.
58 Ibid. at 838.
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relation to the offence of being in possession of a bladed knife, merely
on the ground that the English offence was confined to possession in
a public place.59 After all, I would have thought that if the geograph-
ical scope of the law was the basis for distinguishing the English
offence, the natural way of reading down the impugned Hong Kong
law would be for the CFA to read down its geographical applicability,
but the judges admittedly were reluctant to ‘drastically reduce the
area of operation’60 of the Ordinance.
Most recently, in So Wai Lun, the CFA upheld the constitutionality
of a penal code which criminalized the conduct of the male to the
exclusion of the female when he engages in unlawful sexual inter-
course with a girl under the age of 16.61 In dismissing the argument
that the statute was not discriminating against men, what is discon-
certing is not so much the court’s conclusions but its legal reasoning
or more accurately lack thereof. The court was dutiful in listing the
various legislative rationales for the law, namely:
the problem of teenage pregnancies; not criminalizing the female’s con-
duct because that might deter her from reporting the matter, the legis-
lature’s role in resolving issues engaging society’s code of sexual
morality; and the extent to which it was for the legislature to form a view
on issues as to whether the initiative in these matters is generally taken
by the male,62
but summarily decided, without any legal analysis, that the means
taken by the legislature was proportionate to the ends.63 All its prior
exhortation about giving a generous interpretation to the Chapter III
(Fundamental Rights) provisions of the Basic Law was conveniently
forgotten.64
An interesting deviation from the CFA’s usual conservative stance
on law and order issues arose in Yeung May Wan.65 Sixteen peaceful
demonstrators were convicted in the magistrates’ court for obstruc-
tion of a public place and assault. The CFA quashed their convictions
on the basis that the obstruction posed by the demonstrators was
reasonable and, since the original arrest by the police was illegal, the
demonstrators’ resistance to an unlawful arrest was thus justified.66
This decision would hardly be of any constitutional significance but
for the identities of the accused and the complainants. The demon-
strators belonged to a religious sect known as the Falun Gong which
59 See R v Matthews [2003] 2 Cr App R 19 and L v DPP [2003] QB 137; and see [2006]
3 HKLRD 808 at 828.
60 [2006] 3 HKLRD 808 at 838.
61 [2006] 3 HKLRD 394.
62 Ibid. at 403.
63 Ibid.
64 See Ng Ka Ling, above n. 1 at 340.
65 [2005] 2 HKLRD 212.
66 Ibid. at 247.
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has been severely prosecuted in mainland China since 1999.67 To com-
plicate matters, this demonstration had taken place outside the Liai-
son Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong and the
police report was lodged by staff members of the Liaison Office. It is
against this political backdrop that we can better appreciate the CFA’s
exhortations of liberty for all, including the freedoms of the perse-
cuted and the oppressed:
The freedom to demonstrate is a constitutional right. It is closely asso-
ciated with the freedom of speech. These freedoms of course involve the
freedom to express views which may be found to be disagreeable or
even offensive to others or which may be critical of persons in authority.68
(emphasis supplied)
Two months later, the CFA handed down another landmark judgment
relating to the freedom of assembly.69 This time the court was con-
siderably more subdued. The defendants had organized a public pro-
cession of between 40 and 100 people without prenotifying the police
as required under the law. After their arrests, they challenged the
constitutionality of the legislation on the basis that the statutory dis-
cretions conferred on the police commissioner to object to a notified
public procession and to impose conditions if he reasonably con-
sidered them to be necessary, in the interests of national security or
public safety or public order (ordre public) or the protection of rights
and freedom of others, are too wide and uncertain.70 The majority on
the bench upheld the notification requirement but accepted that the
commissioner’s power to restrict peaceful assembly for the public
order (ordre public) was constitutionally vague and thus severed
‘ordre public’ from public order in the ‘law and order’ sense.71 Since
the defendants had not complied with the notification procedures, the
severance of the constitutionally invalid provisions did not affect their
appeal and their convictions were confirmed.
The reasoning of the CFA was unfortunately seriously flawed. The
court accepted that for a rights-infringing law to pass constitutional
muster, it must be necessary and proportionate.72 Yet nowhere in the
judgment did the CFA explain why it was necessary and propor-
tionate for the commissioner to possess the powers of prior restraint.
Nowhere in the judgment did the court explain why ‘public order’ in
the law and order sense was constitutionally certain and clear. It
merely asserted so.73 In fact all the various statutory grounds for
67 See A. Cheung, ‘In Search of a Theory of Cult and Freedom of Religion in China:
The Case of Falun Gong’ (2004) Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 1.
68 [2005] 2 HKLRD 212 at 216.
69 Leung Kwok Hung v HKSAR [2005] 3 HKLRD 164.
70 Ibid. at 176.
71 Ibid. at 196.
72 Ibid. at 183.
73 Ibid. at 196.
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prohibiting notified processions were wide and vague. As pointed out
by the lone dissenting judge, Justice Bokhary:
National security, public safety and public order are very wide concepts.
The protection of the rights and freedoms of others is a particularly
wide concept. For there are so many rights and freedoms that others
have, and the challenged schemes do not say which of these may be
protected by police powers regarding public assembly. This is a serious
omission.74
The CFA merely obliterated one vague concept from the impugned
regulatory scheme and upheld the rest without explaining why. This is
a serious omission. In fact despite the court’s opening roar about the
‘cardinal importance’ of the ‘precious’ right to freedom of assembly
and how it lies at the foundation of a democratic society, the rhetoric
rang hollow in light of the actual result reached by the court. The
practical benefits of this decision to potential demonstrators are mini-
mal, especially since the commissioner retains a host of at large,
broad powers to prohibit or restrain the organization of public pro-
cessions in Hong Kong.75
At first blush, it might be difficult to reconcile Yeung with Leung as
it is difficult to conceive why the CFA would have such a dramatic
change of mind over the short span of two months. Perhaps in Yeung
the CFA was cognizant that if the court had caved in to the pressures
from the Mainland government, where the validity of a NPCSC Inter-
pretation or NPC law was not at stake and where the court was
adjudicating over a matter within the limits of Hong Kong’s auton-
omy, not only would the independence of this sacred institution be
questioned, the viability of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle
would be impugned. As Chief Justice Li reminded his readers in
Yeung:
These freedoms are at the heart of Hong Kong’s system and it is well
established that the courts should give a generous interpretation to the
constitutional guarantees of these freedoms in order to give to Hong
Kong residents their full measure.76 (emphasis supplied)
The ultimate acquittal of the Falun Gong members was not just about
the vindication of the rule of law in Hong Kong. Their victory attests
to the CFA’s commitment to safeguarding the ‘One Country, Two
Systems’ principle and to treat all members of Hong Kong society
equally, even and especially those derided and persecuted by the cen-
tral government. On the other hand in Leung, where the CFA was
adjudicating over a law and order tussle between the state and the
individual with no central government implications, the court merely
reverted to its general conservative stance on crime control issues. It
74 Ibid. at 229.
75 See J. Baryon, ‘Leung Kwok Hung and Others through the Hong Kong Courts’
(2006) 36 HKLJ 83.
76 [2005] 2 HKLRD 212 at 218.
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seems that the decision in Yeung was just an anomaly and not the
norm.
Notwithstanding the conservative stance of the CFA toward law
and order issues, the court has been very conscious about preserving/
consolidating its powers whilst arriving at decisions that are palatable
to the executive.
In A Solicitor v Law Society,77 the CFA declared a finality clause,
which statutorily abrogated the right of the CFA to hear appeals under
the Legal Practitioners Ordinance, inconsistent with the Colonial Laws
Validity Act 186578 and hence, according to the court, the impugned
provision did not form part of the laws of the Hong Kong SAR upon its
establishment.79
As reasoned by the CFA, since the Orders in Council of 1909 (as
amended in 1957) and 1982 provided that appeals from Hong Kong
would lie (1) as of right from any judgment of the Court of Appeal
where the matter in dispute amounted to more than a specified mon-
etary amount, or (2) by special leave of the Privy Council, the finality
clause that abrogated all appeals to the CFA (the successor body of
the Privy Council) would be repugnant to the Colonial Laws Validity
Act (CLVA) 1865. Certainly the finality clause is inconsistent with the
CLVA 1865, but I question the CFA’s right to make such a declaration.
Whilst Article 160 of the Basic Law grants the CFA the power to
declare Ordinances inconsistent with the Basic Law, there is no Basic
Law or other statutory provision that permits the court to invalidate
Ordinances for being inconsistent with the CLVA 1865. The court
never explained why it had the power to make such a declaration and
merely asserted that the repugnant finality provision was absolutely
void and inoperative from the outset.80 Certainly the finality clause
may have been repugnant as against the CLVA 1865 before the hand-
over but given that it was never invalidated by the Privy Council, its
validity as law previously in force in Hong Kong is preserved under
Article 881 of the Basic Law after the handover. The CFA left un-
answered why it had the power to declare a law, whose validity was
preserved by the Basic Law, inconsistent with a defunct foreign stat-
ute, no longer in force in Hong Kong after the handover.
77 [2004] 1 HKLRD 214.
78 The Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, s. 2 provided: ‘Any Colonial Law which is or
shall be in any respect repugnant to the Provisions of any Act of Parliament
extending to the Colony to which such Law may relate, or repugnant to any
Order or Regulation made under authority of such Act of Parliament, shall be
read subject to such Act, Order or Regulation, and shall, to the Extent of such
Repugnancy, but not otherwise, be and remain absolutely void and inoperative’.
79 [2004] 1 HKLRD 214 at 224.
80 Ibid. at 223.
81 The Basic Law, Art. 8 reads: ‘The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is,
the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and
customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and
subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region’.
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Fortunately, in the alternative, the court had examined the con-
sistency of the finality clause with the Basic Law and held that the
impugned provision would in any event also be incompatible with the
constitutional mandate of Article 82 which vests the power of final
adjudication in the CFA.82 Interestingly, the CFA conceded that, al-
though it had the power of final adjudication under Article 82, this
was not an absolute mandate as limitations on appeal may be placed
by the legislature so long as they pursue a legitimate purpose and
there must be reasonable proportionality between the limitation and
the purpose sought to be achieved.83 Hence, this particular finality
clause fails for abrogating the right of appeal to the CFA totally. What
is curious about this portion of the judgment is not what the CFA said
but what the court omitted. In his written submissions, the Secretary
of Justice had justified the finality clause on the basis that Article 83
provides for the structure, powers and functions of the courts of the
HKSAR at all levels to be prescribed by law.84 Taken to its logical
conclusion, the legislature can thus technically preclude the CFA from
hearing any appeals. Fully aware of the implications of Article 83, it
would appear that the court, in its usual fashion of ignoring difficult
provisions, astutely settled on a compromise that preserves its posi-
tion as the final adjudicator of its own jurisdiction whilst providing an
avenue for the legislature to regulate the court’s jurisdiction stat-
utorily in the interests of justice and efficiency.
The same political astuteness was exercised by the court in Prem
Singh.85 There, the CFA had to decide on the constitutionality of a
statutory immigration scheme that required the Director of Immigra-
tion to grant a foreign national unconditional stay in Hong Kong
before the latter could obtain permanent resident status under Article
24(4) which grants a non-Chinese citizen the right of abode when he
has been an ordinary resident in Hong Kong for seven continuous
years.
The CFA unanimously held that this statutory provision was uncon-
stitutional, though it is interesting to compare the rationale put for-
ward by Justice Ribeiro on behalf of the majority and that proffered
by Justice Bokhary in his separate concurrence. The majority
reasoned that since the non-Chinese applicant would have been sub-
ject to a limit of stay while building up his seven-year continuous
period of ordinary residence, Article 24(4) therefore implicitly regards
satisfaction of the permanent requirement as achievable at a time
when an applicant is still subject to a limit of stay.86 Therefore the
82 [2004] 1 HKLRD 214 at 228.
83 Ibid. at 226.
84 See P. Y. Lo, ‘Master of One’s Own Court’ (2004) HKLJ 47 at 60. The Basic Law,
Art. 83 reads: ‘The structure, powers and functions of the courts of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region at all levels shall be prescribed by law’.
85 [2003] 1 HKLRD 550.
86 Ibid. at 572.
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legislative requirement that the applicant is not to be subject to any
limit of stay after the seven years has accrued would be imposing an
additional requirement incompatible with the requirements of the
Basic Law. The majority’s cautious, logical, but nonetheless legalistic
reasoning contrasted sharply with Justice Bokhary’s flourish in
sweeping aside the impugned provision:
Indeed the notion of any legal right, let alone a constitutional right,
being downgraded to something which can be granted or withheld as a
matter of discretion is repugnant to the rule of law.87
Given that the Director of Immigration had no right to grant condi-
tional stays after the applicant had ordinarily lived in Hong Kong for
seven years, the court thereby backdated the relevant qualifying
period for permanent residency to the date when the applicant first
applied for unconditional stay.88
Notwithstanding this, the applicant had unfortunately overstayed
by 12 days after his limit of stay had expired, before he first applied
for unconditional stay in Hong Kong. Therefore according to the
Director of Immigration, even as of 24 October 1998, the material date
when the appellant applied for unconditional stay, he had not met the
requirement of being an ordinary resident of Hong Kong for seven
continuous years and could not qualify for permanent resident
status.89 Despite counsel on both sides asking the court to decide
there and then whether this brief contravention was material, the
court artfully refused their request and remitted the case to the Direc-
tor of Immigration to redetermine the applicant’s eligibility for perma-
nent residency in light of the new material date and standard
immigration practices. This decision is very puzzling. As pointed out
by counsel for the applicant, if the material date for determining his
eligibility for permanent residency was now 24 October 1998, it would
be inconceivable that he would be denied his constitutional entitle-
ment to the right of abode just because he had technically overstayed
by 12 days,90 especially since at that time he was employed and had no
prison record. The only reason why the court decided as it did, I
believe, was that since that material date, the applicant had been
imprisoned three times for assault and had been sentenced to eight
months two weeks of imprisonment in all.91 This fact was of course
irrelevant technically so far as eligibility for the right of abode is
concerned, since it occurred after the material date; but being the
politically savvy judges they are now, the CFA judges were not going
to deny the Director of Immigration an opportunity to remove an
undesirable character from Hong Kong if he so chooses, especially
since it had really achieved the aim of this appeal, namely to remove
87 Ibid. at 556–7.
88 Ibid. at 578.
89 Ibid. at 580.
90 Ibid. at 582.
91 Ibid. at 564.
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the grant of a constitutional right of abode from the wild clutches of
administrative discretion.
Furthermore, two strange cases concerning judicial remedies arose
in 2006. In the first, Koo Sze Yiu,92 the CFA invalidated a statutory
scheme which allowed the Chief Executive, whenever he considered
that public interest so required, to order the interception or disclosure
of telecommunications to the government. Concerned that an imme-
diate invalidation of the impugned legislation would unduly hamper
legitimate covert surveillance activities, the CFA toyed with the idea of
either according temporary validity to the impugned scheme or sus-
pending its declaration of invalidity until corrective legislation could
be enacted.93 The vacillation between the two remedies is curious as
the Canadian courts, the ones who first conceived of this remedy, had
used both terms interchangeably and had never sought to draw a
distinction between the two.94 This anomaly was also pointed out by
Sir Anthony Mason in his concurring judgment.95 According to the
majority, the difference between the two remedies lies in the fact that
in the former, the executive is shielded from legal liability during the
interim period before the corrective legislation comes into force,
whilst in the latter, no such immunity is provided.96 It is very telling
that the court cited no authorities for this assertion. The majority went
on to suggest that a temporary validity to an otherwise unconstitu-
tional law would only be accorded when a ‘virtual legal vacuum’
would ensue as a result of its immediate invalidation; in all other
instances the only remedy to which the court would resort is the
suspension of its declaration of invalidity.97 Again, no authorities were
cited for this legal proposition but it is evident that the court was
trying to deter the executive from seeking this remedy on a routine
basis whenever a statute was to be deemed unconstitutional.
In the second case, Hung Chan Wah,98 the CFA had to decide
whether it had the power to engage in a prospective ruling. Ultimately
the court did not decide this issue but merely explored possible justifi-
cations for and objections to the exercise of this power.99
At first blush, it seems unusual for the CFA to be so coy about
exercising the right to grant new constitutional remedies. After all, as
discussed earlier, the CFA has never shied away from engaging in
novel remedial interpretations.100 It is my belief that the CFA was so
92 [2006] 3 HKLRD 455.
93 Ibid. at 467.
94 See P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, Vol. 2, 4th edn (Carswell: Toronto,
1997) para. 37.1(d).
95 [2006] 3 HKLRD 455 at 470–1.
96 Ibid. at 467.
97 Ibid.
98 [2006] 3 HKLRD 841.
99 Ibid. at paras. 28–33. The CFA conceded that this power might be necessary to
meet the changing needs of society.
100 See HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai [2006] 3 HKLRD 808.
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circumspect only because it was fully aware that these new ‘powers’
were misnomers; in reality, they were respectively limitations on the
judicial power to grant immediate invalidity to otherwise unconstitu-
tional laws, and restrictions on the court’s power to apply its judg-
ment retrospectively. Having consolidated its powers slowly but
surely over the years, it is thus natural for the CFA to be unwilling to
relinquish any powers so readily. Astutely, by framing its reluctance to
accept a judicial limitation as a disavowal of the right to exercise an
‘extraordinary power’,101 the court was in effect retaining power
under the guise of relinquishing it.
V. The CFA and a Generous Interpretation of the
Basic Law
In the third category are cases which concern neither the constitu-
tionality of NPCSC Interpretations/PRC laws nor domestic law and
order issues. In these instances where the CFA was confident that any
political fallout following an adverse decision would be least severe,
the CFA had been generous about interpreting the Basic Law and
avoiding the austerity of tabulated legalism.
A prime example is the landmark decision of Tse Wai Chun,102
where the CFA unanimously held that under the tort of defamation, a
comment which falls within the defence of fair comment would only
lose its immunity by proof that the defendant did not genuinely hold
the view he expressed.103 Actuation by spite, animosity, intent to
injure or other motivation, even if it is the sole motive, does not of
itself defeat the defence. This redefinition of malice for the purpose of
negating the defence of fair comment is groundbreaking because,
prior to this decision, the conventional wisdom in the Commonwealth
suggested that the defendant would be deemed to have been actuated
by malice if he had some improper or personal motive when he made
the alleged defamatory statement.104 Unlike his usual ambivalence to-
ward giving a robust interpretation of constitutional guarantees,
Chief Justice Li in his concurrence took pains to emphasize that:
The Courts should adopt a generous approach so that the right of fair
comment on matters of public interest is maintained in its full vigour.105
In the same vein, the CFA was decisive in invalidating the electoral
arrangements in New Territories villages (rural pockets of Hong
Kong),106 which only allowed indigenous villagers, that is to say per-
sons who could establish patrilineal descent from an ancestor who
was in 1898 a resident of an established village in Hong Kong, to vote
101 [2006] 3 HKLRD 841 at para. 33.
102 [2000] 3 HKLRD 418.
103 Ibid. at 438.
104 Ibid. at 433.
105 Ibid. at 422.
106 Secretary for Justice v Chan Wah [2000] 3 HKLRD 641.
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or stand as candidates for village representatives, on the basis that
these restrictions denied the non-indigenous villagers the right to take
part in the conduct of public affairs as protected under Article 21(a)
of the Bill of Rights.107 Given that the village representatives had a
common duty to represent the villagers as a whole and not just the
interests of indigenous villagers, this discrimination against non-
indigenous villagers would hardly be justifiable but for Article 40 of
the Basic Law.108 The indigenous villagers argued that Article 40,
which protects the lawful traditional rights and interests of the indigen-
ous inhabitants, implicitly included their political right to vote and
stand as candidates in village elections to the exclusion of others.109
Whilst the CFA did not reject the possibility that there might be deriv-
ative rights which are necessarily implicit within the rights expressly
protected under Article 40, the right to exclude the political interests
of non-indigenous villagers could not be so implied.110 Unfortunately
the court did not provide a reason for reaching this conclusion nor
did the court offer any clue as to how implied rights under Article 40
could be deduced. What is evidently clear, however, is that the CFA
was too eager about promoting political equality to be fettered un-
necessarily by legal niceties.
VI. Conclusion
Chastised by the Mainland government for judicial overreach in
Ng Ka Ling, where the Court of Final Appeal unabashedly declared
the power to review the legislative acts of the National People’s Con-
gress, the court meekly retreated into obscurity but only to draw the
contempt and chagrin of human rights activists and academic
commentators.111
The fundamental jurisprudential conundrum which the CFA faces
is how it can preserve the judiciary as a separate and independent
branch of government whilst quelling any concerns from the Main-
land that Hong Kong courts, if left unleashed, would turn the Island
into another ‘renegade province’ in the south.
If the Hong Kong courts are too aggressive in defending the rights
of the oppressed minority, they might only incur a backlash that takes
the form of an Interpretation from the NPC or even an amendment of
the Basic Law. On the other hand, if they are too indulgent towards
107 The Bill of Rights, Art. 21(a) provides: ‘Every permanent resident shall have the
right and the opportunity . . . and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take
part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives’.
108 The Basic Law, Art. 40 reads: ‘The lawful traditional rights and interests of the
indigenous inhabitants of the “New Territories” shall be protected by the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region’.
109 [2000] 3 HKLRD 641 at 657.
110 Ibid. at 658.
111 Above n. 4.
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the HKSAR government, the Basic Law would be reduced to a mere
hollow shell that only protects constitutional rights on paper but not
in practice.
After a momentary period of abdication in Lau Kong Yung112 and
Ng Kung Siu,113 of late there has been a resurgence of judicial power, a
quiet but determined effort by the CFA to put a brake on legislative
and executive excesses, but its record is haphazard. It is my belief that
the structure I described explains why. In sum, where decisions im-
plicate the validity of NPCSC decisions or PRC laws implemented
under the Basic Law, the court would always defer to the central
government as the judiciary is fully cognizant, after Ng Ka Ling, that
the central government would not permit bold judicial activism on
matters concerning Beijing’s sovereignty over the region. Where dis-
putes concern alleged human rights violations that have no PRC
implications but have law and order implications in Hong Kong, the
court is generally conservative so as to afford the legislature or the
executive much latitude in preserving peace and stability, and so as to
save its goodwill for controversies where the CFA believes it can
triumph. However, in both above-mentioned categories of cases, the
judiciary, whilst granting the executive the result it seeks or, at the
very minimum, can accept, is very jealous about protecting its own
powers of adjudication and takes pains to preserve this prerogative.
On the other hand, in rights-infringement controversies with neither
NPCSC nor domestic law and order implications, the court is deliber-
ately conscious of avoiding the austerity of tabulated legalism as the
justices are probably confident that, in these instances, the backlash
from the Mainland or the Hong Kong SAR government would be
minimal and thus it would be most opportune for the court to inter-
vene aggressively in such cases and advance the development of
human rights in Hong Kong.
For better or worse, this is the CFA’s solution to the jurisprudential
conundrum of observing civil liberties in this new age of Chinese civil
law domination.
Almost 300 years ago, Lord Mansfield once exhorted judges so:
We must not regard political consequences; how formidable soever they
might be: if rebellion was the certain consequence, we are bound to say
‘fiat justitia ruat coelum’ [let justice be done, though the heavens fall].114
Whilst the flagrant judicial disregard of political consequences may
have been possible under the common law three centuries back, this
approach is no longer prudent in post-colonial Hong Kong where the
present legal landscape is the offspring of an unhappy marriage of
two strange bedfellows with distinctively different characters. If the
112 [1999] 3 HKLRD 778.
113 [1999] 3 HKLRD 907.
114 R v Wilkes (1770) 4 Burr 2527 at 2562.
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CFA is blind to the political consequences of its decisions, the execu-
tive branch of the SAR government would just circumvent its judg-
ments by routinely using the NPCSC Interpretation to censure the
court and fetter its powers further. The CFA, aware that it is possibly
the last vanguard of Hong Kong’s autonomy and the branch of gov-
ernment most predisposed to safeguarding the region’s semi-
independence, is thus willing to permit lapses of legal logic and
reasoning, to defend the old legal traditions it inherited and resist the
new system it was born into.
As the eminent Hong Kong constitutional lawyer, Peter Wesley
Smith, once said:
The Basic Law, with all its imperfections, must be made to work, and it
cannot be made to work if judges and lawyers close their eyes to ‘polit-
ical fallout’ and in the process, deny the constitution’s character as a
compromise between incompatible systems of law.115
The drafting and promulgation of the Basic Law was imbued with so
much politics. Can we ever expect its interpretation to be any less
political?
115 P. Wesley Smith, ‘Judicial Autonomy under Hong Kong’s Basic Law’ in R. Ash
(ed.), Hong Kong in Transition: One Country, Two Systems (Routledge Curzon:
London, 2003).
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